Ahmad Hamed Awwad Almanasir and B. Shivaraj

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-7092.2017.06.45

Published: 23 August 2017 

Abstract: This paper aimed to assess the corporate governance voluntary disclosure level and the impact of a set of corporate governances (CG) attributes on the level to which corporate governance voluntary disclosure is conducted in Jordan. Another objective was to determine if Jordanian industrial listed corporations adhere to and disclose good CG practices voluntarily, and if they do, to determine the factors influencing such disclosure. This study employed 61 industrial listed firms for the years 2010-2014. The research developed a general voluntary CG disclosure index composing of 15 Jordanian Corporate Governance Codes and gauged the relationship via pooled OLS and regression method. The results indicated that the proposed Jordanian Corporate Governance Index (JCGI) enhanced voluntary corporate governance disclosure among Jordanian listed firms over the examined years. They also showed varying levels of CG disclosures in different scenarios; 1) it is lower in firms with higher managerial ownership and 2) higher relative to the independent directors’ proportion on the board, audit firm size, and audit committee presence with institutional ownership. Evidence on the compliance level towards the CG code in Amman Stock Exchange is unique and the study is distinct as it provides a pioneering evidence of the achieved compliance level.

Whose Governance? IMF Austerities in a Small Island State: The Case of Jamaica
Pages 190-199
Ann Marie Bissessar

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-7092.2014.03.15

Published: 07 July 2014

Abstract: The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have for a long time embarked on what can be described as a ‘trustee’ relationship with countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean. From the latter half of the 1970s, countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados as well as Grenada were ‘forced’ because of their chronic need for ‘hard’ currency loans to approach the IMF and the World Bank. These loans were accompanied by structural adjustment measures. This paper attempts, for the first time, to evaluate, in the case of Jamaica, whether the measures introduced by the Lending Agencies resulted in some measure of economic growth in the countries under review. The paper then examines the new agreements entered into by these countries and the measures that accompanied them. The overarching argument is that the forces of globalization as well as austerity measures introduced by lending agencies such the IMF and the World Bank prevents rather than encourages small island governments¹ to embark on ‘national’ development plans and programs. In other words, the primary argument of this paper is that these countries are constrained in their ability to ‘govern’ themselves; rather their economic decisions are largely crafted by the forces of globalization and further reinforced by international lending agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Wagner or Keynes for Ghana? Government Expenditure and Economic Growth Dynamics. A ‘VAR’ Approach
Pages 177-183
Kofi Kamasa and Grace Ofori-Abebrese

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6000/1929-7092.2015.04.18

Published: 27 November 2015

Abstract: This paper analysed empirically the causal relationship between government expenditure growth and GDP growth in Ghana from 1980 – 2010. The study employed vector autoregressive (VAR)/Granger causality analysis developed by Sims (1980) and Granger (1969). The cointegration results provided evidence of a unique cointegrating vector. Granger causality test conducted revealed that causality exist only from GDP growth to government expenditure growth and not the vice versa. This implication supports Wagner’s law of expanding state activities for Ghana. This result means that in estimating government expenditure, GDP growth must be taken into account so as to avoid the problem of misspecification and biasness of estimates generated. The findings also suggest that government must focus on policies that would create the enabling environment for growth to thrive rather than increasing its expenditure with the aim of increasing GDP growth.

Young Kyung Ko

DOI: https://doi.org/10.6000/1929-7092.2019.08.24

Published: 12 March 2019  

Abstract: Following the economic crisis in 1997, the Korean government introduced the enhanced corporate governance and reform policy, which drove family-controlled firms to search strategic reaction for control succession and wealth transfer. This paper explores alternative explanations for why Korean firms choose to pay cash dividends around this corporate reform period. What lead firms to pay cash dividends remains largely unexplained by the reducing agency cost, signaling, or life-cycle theories. This study focuses on relations between the ownership structure and cash dividends payout, seeking effects deriving from (i) controlling shareholder (CS) and (ii) their family members. The logit analysis result shows that firms with large control rights, especially higher ownership of other family members of CS are more likely to pay cash dividends. After adjusting for the characteristics that affect the degree of cash dividends, ownership variables are positively related to payout ratios and dividend yields. CS family members’ ownership has a statistically stronger effect on payout ratios than CS’s. These results provide the evidence of incentive for corporate control succession within the family with least costs carried by the family members of controlling shareholders who positively influence payout decisions and dividend ratios.

Keywords: Corporate Payout, Dividend, Corporate Control, Family Firm, Ownership Structure, Succession.

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